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Law & Development is a movement originally based on the idea that Law is a process by which 
rules governing social life are consciously formulated and consistently applied, in a way that 
society is effectively governed by universal and purposive rules.1 The State is seen has the 
primary agent of change and social control, which will use law as an instrument with the purpose 
to transform society and yet will itself be constrained by that law.2 
In that context, some rules seemed to be naturally better than others, as the Law & Development 
studies in the 1960’s advanced the idea that developing nations could/should learn from the legal 
systems of developed countries.  This goal entailed many changes in the legal system of 
developing countries, including the reform of their legal education, judicial systems and 
substantive laws (and if necessary importing foreign norms) with the aim that impartial 
application of rules becomes a reality.3 
But what if is the other way around and developed countries could/should learn from the legal 
solutions of developing countries?  
From the case study of foreign investment disputes we can draw an example of lessons learned 
by Latin American countries that developed countries could/should consider as a learning 
                                                          
1 David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law, 82 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1, 9 (1972). 
2 David M. Trubek and Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and 
Development Studies in the United States, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 1062, 1079 (1974). 
3 David M. Trubek, supra note 1, at 9. 
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experience, while they are increasingly facing the challenges posed by the current Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement regime. 
When investment flows were running mostly from developed to developing countries, the 
reaction about the level of protection received in developing countries was rarely a good one. 
Developed countries secured the status of their nationals through unequal treaties that guaranteed 
extraterritorial application of the law and jurisdiction of such “civilized” countries,4 or challenged 
the substantive and procedural treatment that foreign investors received as not conformed to an 
“international minimum standard”. As a consequence of the latter, Latin America became the 
main example of the use (and abuse) first of “diplomatic protection”, and later, of investor-state 
arbitration. 
In recent years, investment flows have changed and developed countries are increasingly 
recipients of investment from developing countries. That has opened the possibility for disputes 
where in a reversal of the traditional roles, a developed country is challenged in its policies or 
regulations by foreign investors from developing countries whose investment has been affected. 
The reaction of developed countries as host States is no different from the ones of developing 
countries in the past. Some are looking to limit the interpretation of certain standards and others 
are outraged that their domestic courts are discarded as a natural forum of these disputes. This 
paper will analyze what developed countries can learn from developing countries copious 
experience in this field. 
                                                          
4 ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (Cambridge 
University Press 2007).   
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Lesson # 1: Latin American reaction to the use of force by developed countries 
to protect foreign investors 
Historically, foreign investment disputes were settled either by the domestic courts where 
investment took place (host State) or through diplomatic protection.5 Diplomatic protection is a 
concept of customary international law and consists of the invocation by a State (“Home State”), 
of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of 
that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the 
implementation of such responsibility.6 
The main reason for the use of diplomatic protection was that home States would not always 
agree with the level of protection host States could provide to foreign investors via domestic 
courts, and the idea of an “International Minimum Standard” was advanced by developed 
countries vis-à-vis a “National Standard” espoused by certain developing countries notably in 
Latin America.7 Elihu Root, in his address to the 1910 Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of International Law (ASIL) summarized the position of United States with regards to the 
protection of its citizens abroad: 8 
“Each country is bound to give to the nationals of another country in its territory the benefit of the 
same laws, the same administration, the same protection, and the same redress for injury which it 
gives to its own citizens, and neither more nor less: provided the protection which the country 
gives to its own citizens conforms to the established standard of civilization. 
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such general acceptance by 
all civilized countries as to form a part of the international law of the world. The condition upon 
which any country is entitled to measure the justice due from it to an alien by the justice which it 
                                                          
5 RUDOLF DOLZER AND CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 221–220 (2012). 
6 Jorge E. Viñuales and Dolores Bentolila, The Use of Alternative (Non-Judicial) Means to Enforce Investment 
Awards Against States, in DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 248, 267 (Laurence Boisson 
de Chazournes eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012). 
7 SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 33 (Studies in international law, v. 26, 
Oxford ; Portland, Or, Hart Pub 2009). 
8 Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 517, 20–21 (1910). 
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accords to its own citizens is that its system of law and administration shall conform to this 
general standard. If any country's system of law and administration does not inform to that 
standard, although the people of the country may be content or compelled to live under it, no 
other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its 
citizens.”  
At this time, the use of diplomatic protection included both peaceful and non-peaceful means of 
dispute settlement and powerful countries could decide either to stand before an international 
tribunal or to use force unilaterally. When the latter happened – as Paulsson as famously 
acknowledged – the “diplomatic” part of the “diplomatic protection”, was “an ironic but hardly 
subtle fiction”.9 Latin American countries were especially affected by the abuse of diplomatic 
protection and faced armed intervention and occupation by military forces sent by the 
government of the investor’s home State.10  
The perceived abuse on the use of diplomatic protection led the countries of the region to take the 
position that aliens had no greater rights than those recognized to the citizens of the host 
country,11 especially in cases of loss of life or property.12 For that reason, most Latin American 
host States tried to confine investment remedies to its local courts and institutions, holding that 
domestic courts had a primary role in the settlement of foreign investment disputes and rejecting 
diplomatic protection except in cases of denial of justice or evident violation of principles of 
international law.13 This idea was dubbed as the “Calvo Doctrine” following the writings of the 
Argentinean diplomat Carlos Calvo, especially in his treatise “International Law of Europe and 
                                                          
9 JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures (No. 17), 
Cambridge University Press 2005). 
10 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes, 1 ICSID REVIEW 1, 1 (1986). 
11 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 395 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
12 Jorge L Esquirol, Latin America, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553, 568 
(Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds., Oxford University Press 2012). 
13 SANTIAGO MONTT, supra note 8, at 40–41. 
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America in Theory and Practice” (1868),14 although there is evidence that another prominent 
Latin American jurist, the Venezuelan Andres Bello, who was in fact the first one in advancing 
this principle.15 In any case, Calvo explicitly pointed out that European nations followed a 
different principle of intervention in their dealings with Latin-American States, as European 
States in their reciprocal relations had invariably followed the rule that “the recovery of debts and 
the pursuit of private claims does not justify de plano the armed intervention of governments”.16 
But soon Latin American countries went beyond the idea of accepting diplomatic protection as a 
subsidiary remedy, and devised the so-called “Calvo Clause”, which was inserted in contracts 
between foreign investors and the host State, where aliens agreed to forego their rights to request 
diplomatic protection from their home State, in any dispute arising out of that contract.17 In this 
offspring of the Calvo Doctrine – that as Montt points out was also not invented by Calvo18 – 
there is an intention to effectively restrict diplomatic protection, even if it is implemented through 
peaceful means.  
The Calvo Doctrine and especially the Calvo Clause were contested by developed capital-
exporting countries, and notably by the United States.19 In 1873, after receiving a note from the 
Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs affirming that Mexico was not responsible for the harm 
                                                          
14 1 CARLOS CALVO, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL TEÓRICO Y PRÁCTICO DE EUROPA Y AMÉRICA (D’Amyot 1868). 
These ideas were further elaborated in the 1896 French edition of this book (“Le Droit International Théorique et 
Pratique”). See: Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Calvo Clause in Latin American Constitutions and International Law, 
33 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 206 (1949).  
15 Frank Griffith Dawson, The Influence of Andres Bello on Latin-American Perceptions of Non-Intervention and 
State Responsibility, 57 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 253, 273 (1987).SANTIAGO MONTT, supra note 
8, at 42. 
16 Carlos Calvo, Le Droit International Théorique et Pratique, §205, pp. 350-351, cited by Amos S. Hershey, The 
Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26, 27 (1907). 
17 CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION 192 (Oxford; New York, Oxford University 
Press 2008). 
18 According to Montt, the earliest evidence for these provisions is a decree that Peru issued in 1846 and it was also 
included in a contract for completion of the most important railroad line in Chile in 1861, both several years before 
Calvo’s first edition of his treatise. SANTIAGO MONTT, supra note 8, at 46. 
19 DONALD RICHARD SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 37 (University of Minnesota Press 1955). 
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caused to foreigners during the civil war by reference to Calvo’s writings, the US ambassador in 
Mexico responded that “Dr Calvo was a young lawyer whose theories had not been accepted 
internationally”. 20 Regarding the Calvo Clause, it was debated if foreign investors could waive 
the right of diplomatic protection that is vested in their national State and not in the investor 
itself.21 Most European countries followed a less stringent opposition about the Calvo Doctrine 
and even recognized a partial validity of the Calvo Clause, holding that a contractual undertaking 
by a private person not to have recourse to diplomatic protection does not bind the home State if 
there is a violation of the generally recognized rules of international law.22  
But the Calvo Doctrine and the Calvo Clause were not the only avenue that was explored by 
Latin American countries to oppose forceful diplomatic protection. When it was not possible to 
sustain exclusive domestic jurisdiction for investment disputes, most of Latin American countries 
agreed on resolve such disputes using peaceful methods of diplomatic protection, mainly bi-
national (or mixed) claims commissions or ad-hoc arbitrations. The solution of every 
international conflict arising between Latin American States, by means of arbitration was even 
advanced as a “principle of American Public Law” in Pan-American Conferences, being 
commonly used by the end of the 19th century23 and early on the 20th century. 24 From 1794 to 
1938, Latin American countries participated in almost 200 arbitrations.25 The bulk of the 
arbitrations took place during the first century following the independence of Latin American 
countries from 1829 through 1910. In that period, Latin American States entered into 160 
                                                          
20 JAN PAULSSON, supra note 10, at 21. 
21 ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 366 (Cambridge University Press). 
22 DONALD RICHARD SHEA, supra note 20, at 46–56. 
23 Alejandro Alvarez, Latin America and International Law, 3 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
269, 301, 303, 328–30 (1909). 
24 CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 36 (New York, Oxford University Press 2008). 
25 ALEXANDER MARIE STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1990). 
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arbitrations, including almost 80 arbitrations with European States, around 40 with the United 
States, around 40 among themselves, and 1 with Japan.26 
It has been affirmed that Latin American countries were not necessarily fond of arbitration, when 
disputes involved developed countries, as it was frequently imposed as the sole alternative to 
forceful intervention,27 or as a merely extension of the “gunboat diplomacy”, as home States of 
the foreign investors “were seen to control the arbitral process in a way that permitted it to be 
used simply as a tool for extracting concessions from the host country”.28 For Summers, as a large 
number of disputes were effectively solved through arbitration, is pointless to discuss if they 
“were entered into by a genuine respect for the arbitral process or by fear of force, or by a 
combination of both factors”.29  
However, a more detailed analysis of the output of these peaceful mechanisms of dispute 
settlement shows that were far from a “victor’s justice”, and there was also an interest of 
developing countries to improve diplomatic protection when it was used peacefully. 
To start, it is true that Latin American States were sometimes forced to submit disputes to 
arbitration by European sovereigns “whose predispositions and sympathies did not always inspire 
confidence among developing countries”, 30 but normally arbitration took place under party-
appointed arbitrators, although this did not always guarantee impartiality. In some of the earlier 
arbitrations, each party selected and paid their own arbitrators, so the one appointed was “almost 
                                                          
26 Lionel M. Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 7 (1972). 
27 SANTIAGO MONTT, supra note 8, at 38. 
28 Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and William W. Park, New Face of Investment Arbitration, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 
367 (2003). 
29 Lionel M. Summers, supra note 27, at 6. 
30 Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and William W. Park, supra note 29, at 367. 
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of necessity compelled to be the particular representative of his country rather than a judge”.31 
Plus, an umpire was sometimes selected by lot, a method that was questioned as haphazard and 
likely to breed injustice and dissatisfaction. 32 In any case, they rarely had a Latin American acting 
as an arbitrator.33 Later arbitrations showed a substantive improvement, with the appointment of 
“neutral” or independent arbitrator and umpires. 34 
With respect to bi-national claims commissions, in the beginning they were essentially “one-
sided”, having the Latin American country always as the defendant. An explanation to this 
imbalance could be the fact that there were more European and American investments in Latin 
America than the opposite, and those investors were effectively affected by revolutions and 
disturbances in Latin America that caused substantial damage to persons and property.35 
However, in later cases bi-national claims commissions were created to hear the claims of 
nationals of both sides.  
An example of this evolution is provided by the claims commissions between Mexico and the 
United States. The first bi-national claims commission between both countries was established 
under the Treaty of April 11, 1839, for claims involving hundreds of American citizens, and 
millions of dollars in damages on their property, mainly during the Mexican independence war.36 
This commission met in Washington from August 25, 1840 to February 25, 1842 and reviewed 
109 claims, with a total of USS$2,026,139.68  awarded to the claimants. However, a large 
number of cases were left unsettled by the commission and over the following years new claims 
                                                          
31 JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 224 (Stanford University Press 
1929). 
32 Id. at 225. 
33 Lionel M. Summers, supra note 27, at 8. Summers offers an explanation for this unbalance: Latin American States 
preferred European sovereigns as arbiters, even in intra- Latin American disputes. 
34 JACKSON H. RALSTON, supra note 32, at 225. 
35 Lionel M. Summers, supra note 27, at 8. 
36 Peter Mark Jonas, United States Citizens Vs. Mexico, 1821-1848 1–2 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D., Marquette 
University). 
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continued to multiply. As the Mexican government failed to pay the full amount of the awards, 
these became a source of conflict between the United States and Mexico that later derived in the 
Mexican-American War of 1846-1848.37  
A later US-Mexico General Claims Commission was constituted by a Convention in 1923,  with 
the intention to settle disputes between both countries from 1868 and including claims against 
one government by nationals of the other, for losses or damages originating from acts of officials 
or others acting for either government. The commission worked from 1924-1931 and from 1934-
1937, reaching a final agreement in 1941.38 A total of 3,617 claims were filed with the General 
Claims Commission, of which 2,781 claims were against Mexico and 836 against the United 
States.39 
It has also been pointed out that the total amount of the awards in claims commissions was 
disproportionately large in favor of the US and Europe.40 But we should also compare the sums 
awarded with the amounts claimed.  For example the blockade and bombing of Venezuelan ports 
in 1902 by Germany, England and Italy after the failure of Venezuela to pay unsettled debts and 
damages to foreigners,41 ended up with a subsequent agreement to arbitrate with the “enforcing 
powers” and with other countries that did not participate in the forceful intervention but held 
similar claims against Venezuela (Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, Mexico, United States 
and Sweden-Norway). 42 The outcomes of such arbitrations were far from the amounts claimed 
by the investors. For example, the Americans claimants were awarded around 3% of their claims; 
                                                          
37 Id. at 3–4. 
38 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, supra note 12, at 401, 402. 
39 United States of America, United Mexican States, U.S. - Mexico General Claims Commission, in REPORTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS - RECUEIL DES SENTENCES ARBITRALES, VOLUME IV 3 (United Nations 2006). 
40 Lionel M. Summers, supra note 27, at 8. 
41 CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, supra note 18, at 191. 
42 JACKSON H. RALSTON, supra note 32, at 223. 
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the Germans around 27%, and the English 63% (an outcome that could derive from the fact that 
the UK decided to filter the claims submitted to arbitration, allowing only the ones considered of 
a “good character”).43 
The US-Mexico General Claims Commission is also a good example of this. Within the period 
ending August 30, 1931, it disposed only of 148 claims (out of the total of 3,617 claims filed with 
it). Awards favourable to American claimants were granted in 89 cases, the sums allowed 
amounting to US$4,607,926.59. Awards favourable to Mexican claimants were granted in five 
cases, the sums allowed amounting to US$39,000.00. 44 
But, by a convention of November 19, 1941, Mexico agreed to pay in instalments a total of 
$40,000,000.00 in settlement of the claims presented before the General Claims Commission, and 
certain other outstanding agrarian and international claims. From that sum, under the Settlement 
of Mexican Claims Act approved December 18, 1942, a domestic American Mexican Claims 
Commission rendered final decisions in claims of American nationals against Mexico. This 
domestic commission worked until April 4, 1947, and considered 1,397 cases and granted awards 
in the total sum of US$37,948,200.05, payable to claimants, with no money available for 
payment of any interest.45 So in fact, from the total of 2781 claims filed against Mexico, only 
1545 were awarded in favour of American citizens, a 55,5% of the total, that received an average 
of US$24,561.9 with no interest, even if in some cases disputes arose in the 19th century. 
On the other hand, some of these claims commissions and ad-hoc arbitrations even gave 
recognition to the Calvo Clause. Probably the most influential decision in this regard was the one 
formulated in the North American Dredging Company of Texas case (1923), by the 
                                                          
43 Id. at 224. 
44 United States of America, United Mexican States, supra note 40, at 3. 
45 Id. at 4. 
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abovementioned US-Mexico General Claims Commission.46 In this case, the commission 
recognized a limited validity of the Calvo Clause under the rules of international law, establishing 
that it was legally binding on the individual, as required him to seek redress for his grievances in 
the local courts, but that was not binding on the government of the home State of the same 
person, in cases of denial or delay of justice.47 Later arbitral decisions followed the same 
reasoning of North American Dredging Co. holding that a Calvo Clause could be effective unless 
in cases of a “denial of justice” in instances where the conduct of the State was grave and the 
interest involved was substantial.48  
If we analyze this example in the framework of Law & Development, we have that Latin 
American States – as developing countries – did not accept the legal theories coming from 
developed capital-exporting countries, regarding the use of diplomatic protection as a legal mean 
to protect its foreign investors and investments in developing countries, either by forceful or 
diplomatic means.  
They did that mostly using legal reasoning to defend its position against diplomatic protection, as 
it took place in the region during the second half of 19th century and the first half of the 20th 
century. Among the tools used by these countries in this process, we find the advancement of 
principles of international law (such as the Calvo Doctrine) and the improvement of mechanisms 
of peaceful diplomatic protection (such as bi-national claims commissions). 
                                                          
46 For a detailed analysis of this jurisprudence, especially in the US-Mexico General Claims Commission, see 
DONALD RICHARD SHEA, supra note 20, at 194–257. 
47 North American Dredging Company of Texas (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States (March 31, 1926), IV [2006] 
Reports of International Awards 26, ¶ 14 (us). 
48 Christopher K. Dalrymple, Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
and the Calvo Clause, 29 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 161, 168 (1996). 
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Latin American countries were particularly successful in one key aspect: the legal proscription of 
the use of force for the enforcement of private debts.49 In the 1907 Convention Respecting the 
Limitations of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, also known as 
“Hague Convention II” or “Drago-Porter Convention”,50 the contracting States agreed not to use 
armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country as 
being due to its nationals, against the government of another country, except if the debtor state 
refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, prevents any “compromis” from being 
agreed on, or fails to comply with the award.51 A more absolute restriction of the use of force 
came finally with the 1945 UN Charter, and according to its Article 2(4) is not a permissible 
method for the exercise of the right of diplomatic protection.52 Today the use of armed force is 
formally limited to give effect to decisions of the Security Council in cases of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Article 42) or in cases of individual or collective 
self-defence (Article 51).53 
Latin American countries were also partially effective in affirming the principle that domestic 
courts should be the main forum to deal with foreign investments disputes, except in justified 
cases, such as denial of justice. Although as we will see in the next section, this achievement was 
superseded by the ample acceptance of international arbitration as a method to solve investor-
State disputes, that took place in Latin America by the end of the 20th century. 
                                                          
49 SANTIAGO MONTT, supra note 8, at 49. 
50 Wolfgang Benedek, Drago-Porter Convention (1907), MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Jan. 2007), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e733?rskey=s0r2Cp&result=1&prd=OPIL. 
51 Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts, 2, 82 81 
(1908). 
52 CHITTHARANJAN FELIX AMERASINGHE, supra note 18, at 27. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (Jun. 26, 1945), http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. 
53 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, supra note 54. 
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Lesson # 2: Latin America and Investor-State arbitration  
After the Cold War, developing countries in Latin America quickly changed their approach to the 
standards of protection to property of foreigners, carrying to more radical extremes than their 
previously moderate positions. In the quarter century following the end of World War II, a wave 
of expropriations took place in Eastern Europe, former colonies and also in Latin America.54 
From defending national treatment against the international minimum standard, Latin American 
countries moved to the principle of compensation according to what the host State deemed 
appropriate – even if it was different to the one applicable to nationals, or in fact to expropriation 
without compensation.55 In this framework, the tribunal naturally competent to know an 
investment claim was the host State’s domestic courts. 
By the early 60’s, the difficulties to achieve a consensus on the obligations of host States toward 
foreign investors had become evident for developed countries. In that context, the World Bank 
began to work on an alternative for the settlement of investment disputes to host State courts – 
affirmed by developing countries as the natural forum of these conflicts, and the State to State 
dispute settlement, through either legal or diplomatic means – asserted by developed countries 
when the international minimum standard of treatment to aliens was not achieved in host States. 
The result of the several years of work and negotiations at the World Bank, was the Convention 
establishing the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (CIADI), 56 which 
                                                          
54 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, supra note 12, at 405–6. 
55 SANTIAGO MONTT, supra note 8, at 56. 
56 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 17 UST 1270, 
TIAS 6090, 575 UNTS 159. 
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establishes a dispute settlement of disputes not between States but between private parties on one 
side and host States on the other.57 
The preliminary and first drafts of the ICSID Convention were elaborated in 1963-1964. At the 
Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the World Bank held in Tokyo in September 1964, 
a resolution was approved asking the Executive Directors to formulate the final text of the 
envisaged convention, with the assistance of invited legal experts designated by member 
countries. 58  
For the first time in the Bank’s history a major resolution was met with substantial opposition on 
a final vote, as 21 countries voted against the proposal59 (all Latin American States, the 
Philippines and Iraq). During that meeting, on September 9, 1964, the Governor for Chile, Mr. 
Felix Ruiz, in representation of 19 Latin American countries made the following statement that 
has been later known as “the No of Tokyo”:60 
I should particularly like to stress the opinion of the countries whom I here represent with respect 
to the draft Agreement on Conciliation and Arbitration. 
We consider undesirable the resolution submitted to the Board of Governors, which recommends, 
and entrusts to the Boards of Directors of the Bank, the drafting of an international agreement to 
create a center for conciliation and arbitration to which foreign private investors could have 
recourse for the settlement of their disputes with governments of member countries, without 
necessary having to exhaust the formalities and procedures of the national tribunals. It is 
believed that this would stimulate private investment in the underdeveloped economies. 
The legal and constitutional systems of all Latin American countries that are members of the 
Bank offer the foreign investor at the present time the same rights and protection as their own 
nationals; they prohibit confiscation and discrimination and require that any expropriation on 
justifiable grounds of public interests shall be accompanied by fair compensation fixed, in the 
final resort, by the law courts. 
                                                          
57 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, supra note 12, at 456–57. 
58 ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 67–68 (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2012). 
59 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, supra note 12, at 460. 
60 2 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID), HISTORY OF THE ICSID 
CONVENTION, 606 (Washington D.C, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 1968). 
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The new system that has been suggested would give the foreign investor, by virtue of the fact 
that he is a foreigner, the right to sue a sovereign state outside its national territory, dispensing 
with the courts of law. This provision is contrary to the accepted legal principles of our countries 
and, de facto, would confer a privilege on the foreign investor, placing the nationals of the 
country concerned in a position of inferiority 
I must state, Mr. President, that the procedure suggested does not meet with the approval of our 
countries because it contravenes constitutional principles relating to this question that cannot be 
ignored. 
This declaration affirms what Latin American countries defended at the time: domestic courts as 
a natural forum to solve investment disputes, with peaceful diplomatic protection only eventually 
allowed, always previous exhaustion of local remedies. At this moment, even arbitration was not 
supported by Latin American countries.  From 1910 to 1939, there were only 30 arbitrations 
involving Latin American States, and since World War II, the only significant arbitrations were 
those related to the boundaries between Chile and Argentina, and Honduras and Nicaragua. 61 
The political context probably contributed to this diminishing trend, as also the practice of 
contract-based arbitration for investment disputes used in the 50’s, where arbitral decisions 
concluded that contracts between the host States and foreign corporations were 
“internationalized” and therefore not governed by the domestic law of the host country.62 
By the end of the ‘80s and early ‘90s, a major reversal of this policy took place in Latin America, 
as some countries began to sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs)63  in order to stimulate 
economic growth through foreign direct investment (FDI) and at the same time privatized their 
                                                          
61 Lionel M. Summers, supra note 27, at 7. 
62 ANTONY ANGHIE, supra note 4, at 225–26. 
63 Bilateral Investment Treaties are defined as “a reciprocal legal agreement concluded between two sovereign States 
for the promotion and protection of investments by investors of the one State (‘home State’) in the territory of the 
other State (‘host State’)”. Marc Jacob, Investments, Bilateral Treaties, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
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energy and utility companies,64 in pursuit of their economic interests, in order to become an 
attractive location to potential foreign investors.65   
Although initially, BITs were concluded between a developing and a developed country, usually 
at the initiative of the latter,66 with the increasing integration of the world economy and trade 
liberalization, this pattern changed especially during the ‘90s, when developing countries and 
economies in transition started signing bilateral investment treaties among themselves and in 
large numbers.67 Also, only some years later, investment chapters began to be included within 
certain free trade agreements (FTAs), following the example of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)68 which Chapter 11 is in many respects, based on BITs.69 In fact, NAFTA 
placed the regime in a new context, and we can consider its Chapter 11 as the first investment 
treaty signed between two developed countries, Canada and the United States.70 
So now, developed countries could be the target of investor-State arbitration. And they did not 
like it.71 Remarkably, in the case of NAFTA the role reversal for the US and Canada did not 
occur because investors from Mexico began bringing claims against them. Instead, investors from 
Canada and the United States started attacking each other’s country. Today, possibilities for 
developed countries to be respondent in Investor-State arbitration are increasing, as FDI flows 
                                                          
64 Katia Fach Gómez, Latin America and ICSID, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1708325 2 (Social Science Research 
Network, Rochester, NY), Nov. 12, 2010. 
65 Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them, 38 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
639, 643–44 (1998). 
66 Pakistan and Germany signed the first BIT on November 25, 1959. Other European countries soon followed the 
German example.  
67 See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS. (New York, United Nations 2005). 
68 Canada-Mexico-United States, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dic. 17, 1992, 32 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 289 (1993).  
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from developing economies are growing. In 2012 their share in global outflows reached a record 
31%, amounting to $426 billion, although the region also accounted for a record share of 52% of 
FDI inflows. Yet, United States is still the largest recipient of FDI in the world and several 
developed countries are in the top 20 host economies. 72 
After Americans and Canadians began to experience the host State perspective, the praise for 
arbitration began to fade, being replaced by complaints about infringement of national 
sovereignty, transparency and democracy. As Aguilar and Park points out: 73 
 “Environmental and consumer groups, as well as the media and Congress, began taking the 
position that NAFTA undermined legitimate governmental regulations, challenged legislative 
prerogatives, and opened decision-making to ill-informed foreign tribunals. The NAFTA process 
was attacked for the confidentiality of its proceedings («lack of transparency»), uncertainty, and 
absence of accountability to domestic constituents. A dispute resolution process that had been fair 
for the rest of the world came to be seen as a tool to put business before public interest” 
In 2013, an unusually high number of Investor-State arbitration cases were filed against 
developed States, the majority of them members of the European Union. The most frequent 
respondent State in that period was the Czech Republic, followed by Egypt, Spain, Uzbekistan 
and Canada. Of a total of 57 new cases, 45 were brought by investors from developed countries 
and the remaining by investors from developing countries.74 
Critics of Investor-State arbitration in general, have stressed that such system allows foreign 
investors to bring a dispute against the host State without exhaustion of local remedies in 
domestic courts,75 bringing private arbitrators to decide the legality of sovereign acts by 
                                                          
72 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013. 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT. 2–4 (2013). 
73 Id. at 370–71. 
74 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Recent Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), IIA ISSUES NOTE, Apr. 2014, at 2. 
75 Michael E. Schneider, Investment Disputes - Moving Beyond Arbitration, in DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL MEANS OF 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 119, 120 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012). 
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contracting out the judicial function in public law.76 There are also concerns about qualifications 
and independence of arbitrators, frivolous claims, “nationality planning” and “treaty shopping”, 
high costs of arbitration, its lack of transparency and coherence, expansive or inconsistent 
interpretations of treaty provisions, erroneous arbitral decisions, and a growing perception of lack 
of legitimacy of the system.77  
Regardless of whether such self-perceptions are valid or not – that is definitely a matter of a 
separate research – it is interesting to analyse the reaction of developed countries to this “threat”. 
To some, a double standard seems to be in place in developed countries’ attitudes toward 
investor-Stare arbitration: it is good when it corrects misbehavior by foreign host States (mostly 
developing countries), but not so desirable when claims are filed for alleged wrongdoing by a 
developed State. 78 
But it seems, some developed countries have “learned the lessons” of the past experiences of 
Latin American countries with respect to investment dispute settlement. They now praise the 
Calvo Doctrine – most of the times without using that name, of course. There are also doubts 
among developed countries in general about the efficiency of investment treaties and their 
particular arbitration system. 79  
In 2002, the then Senator from Nevada John Kerry, presented to the US. Senate what has been 
known as “the Kerry Amendment” to ensure that any artificial trade distorting barrier relating to 
foreign investment was eliminated in any trade agreement entered into under the Bipartisan Trade 
                                                          
76 See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4 (Oxford University Press, USA 
2008). 
77 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
In Search of A Roadmap 12, 2–4 (International Investment Agreements - Issues Notes, 2013). 
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Promotion Authority Act of 2002. This proposal was quite controversial, as it reflected the 
positions of various organizations that have been most ardently opposed to investment treaties in 
general and to investor-State dispute settlement in particular.  Among other things, the Kerry 
Amendment established that a trade agreement that includes investment provisions should: 80 
(D) ensure that foreign investors are not granted greater legal rights than citizens of the United 
States possess under the United States Constitution; 
(…) 
(F) ensure that standards for minimum treatment, including the principle of fair and equitable 
treatment, shall grant no greater legal rights than United States citizens possess under the due 
process clause of the United States Constitution; 
The proposal also aimed to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an investor 
and a government, in matters such as selection of arbitrators, transparency, amicus curiae, and the 
establishment of a single appellate body. However, required an investor to go through a home 
State screening mechanism before submitting a claim against the host State to arbitration: 81 
  (H) ensure that— 
(i) a claim by an investor under the agreement may not be brought directly unless the investor 
first submits the claim to an appropriate competent authority in the investor’s country; 
(ii) such entity has the authority to disapprove the pursuit of any claim solely on the basis that it 
lacks legal merit; and  
(iii) if such entity has not acted to disapprove the claim within a defined period of time, the 
investor may proceed with the claim; 
The Kerry Amendment was ultimately defeated.82 However, the Obama Administration has 
recently declared its adherence to Investor-State arbitration, based on the premise that offers 
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“basic legal protections for American companies abroad that are based on the same assurances 
the United States provides at home”.83 
Within NAFTA, both Canada and United States have promoted the “clarification” of the 
standards of Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and Full Protection and Security (FPS) 
prescribed in its Article 1105, and NAFTA Free Trade Commission has declared that they “do 
not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens”.84 However, several arbitral tribunals 
have surprisingly challenged this interpretation, emphasizing the evolutionary character of these 
standards, and recognizing at least theoretically, a level of protection to foreign investors superior 
to the one under the traditional interpretation of the minimum standard of treatment.85 
In Europe, the discussion of Investor-State arbitration has dominated the early negotiations of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the U.S, with several commentators 
questioning if it is really necessary to have Investor-State arbitration in that treaty, as the 
administrative and judicial systems developed in the EU and the US have to be considered 
sufficient for protecting legal rights of foreign investors who disagree with regulatory 
intervention and seek legal remedies.86 Although Investor-State arbitration is still part of the on-
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84 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) - Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain 
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going negotiations, the EU is holding an online public consultation on investment protection and 
investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the TTIP, with the aim of improving the system.87 
The Australian Government announced in April 2011 that will no longer include investor-State 
dispute resolution procedures in trade agreements, declaring that “If Australian businesses are 
concerned about sovereign risk in Australian trading partner countries, they will need to make 
their own assessments about whether they want to commit to investing in those countries”. 88  
At the same time, and completely embracing the “Calvo Doctrine”, the Gillard Government 
declared its support to the principle of national treatment “that foreign and domestic businesses 
are treated equally under the law”, denying support to provisions “that would confer greater legal 
rights on foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses”, or “that would 
constrain the ability of Australian governments to make laws on social, environmental and 
economic matters in circumstances where those laws do not discriminate between domestic and 
foreign businesses”.89  If this policy is implemented, domestic courts would be the sole 
jurisdiction available for investment disputes, to investors from countries with no current 
investment treaty providing Investor-State arbitration.  
Although Australia already notably declined to be bound by an investor-State arbitration in the 
US-Australia FTA pointing out the reliability of its own legal system for resolving disputes 
involving U.S. investors,90 that did not prevent US-based Philip Morris to start a well-known 
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arbitration against Australia on November 21, 201191 - through its Hong Kong branch – claiming 
that governmental regulations on plain-packaging of cigarettes violated the Hong Kong-Australia 
BIT. 92 However, a recent change of government in Australia could signal a change in this policy, 
as is suggested by the recent FTA agreed with Korea in early December 2013, which again 
contemplates, Investor-State arbitration.93 However, the more recent Australia-Japan FTA does 
not include provisions on Investor-State arbitration.94 
The abovementioned examples of US, EU and Australia can be compared with the attitudes of 
the developing countries of Latin America against the same criticisms formulated against 
Investor-State arbitration. And there is a stark contrast. 
Today, as ICSID caseload statistics shows, Latin America is the region with the higher number of 
cases registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules by State Party 
involved (34%).95 Over the past years, several countries of the area have responded to one or 
more investment treaty arbitration, being Argentina96 the most frequent respondent in the overall 
statistics, followed by Venezuela, Ecuador and Mexico.97 Ecuador has also faced the highest 
                                                          
91 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Australia, UNCITRAL (Hong Kong/Australia BIT). 
92 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Philip Morris Files for Arbitration over Intellectual 
Property Dispute with Australia, 2 INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS QUARTERLY 13 (2011).  
93 Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
(KAFTA) - Key outcomes, http://dfat.gov.au/fta/kafta/fact-sheet-key-outcomes.html. 
94 Luke Nottage, Why no investor–state arbitration in the Australia–Japan FTA? | East Asia Forum (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/04/09/why-no-investor-state-arbitration-in-the-australia-japan-fta/. 
95 By December 31, 2013, this percentage accounts 27% for South America and 7% for Central America and the 
Caribbean. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, 
ISSUE 2014-1 11, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.  
96 Most of Argentina’s cases arose from the economic crisis and social collapse of 2011and the measures taken by 
the Argentine State to offset it and its consequences. Ignacio Torterola and Diego Brian Gosis, Argentina, in LATIN 
AMERICAN INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWS, TREATIES, AND DISPUTES FOR 
INVESTORS, STATES AND COUNSEL 5, 15 (Jonathan C. Hamilton eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012). 
97 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Recent Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), IIA ISSUES NOTE, Mar. 2013, at 4. 
  Rodrigo Polanco  
23 
 
award against a host State (US$1.77 billion)98 although an annulment proceeding is currently 
taking place since October 2012. While some investors from Latin American countries have 
initiated arbitration proceedings under ICSID, notably from Mexico, Argentina and Chile,99 
foreign investors from States of the region do not rank as the most frequent claimants. 
Such scenario has understandably fostered concerns and criticisms about this regime of Investor-
State dispute settlement in Latin America, and especially against ICSID which has become the 
most relevant forum of investment disputes for the region. While some countries have taken the 
more radical position of exiting the system, others have decided to exhaust all recourses within 
the system before complying with the award,100 or even have pushed the limits of the regime 
“proactively non-paying”101 before settling some claims – as is the case of Argentina,102 who has 
reportedly paid five outstanding awards103 and reached a preliminary pact on compensation in the 
Repsol104 case.105  
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After facing basically the same problem than Australia – the questioning of its policy of plain 
packaging of cigarettes in the framework of general anti-tobacco measures – Uruguay has not 
menaced to stop negotiating agreements with Investor-State arbitration provisions or to withdraw 
from ICSID.  Notably this is the first arbitration before ICSID equally for Uruguay106 and 
Australia, being both arbitral procedures still pending.  
As mentioned, other countries of the region have taken a stronger stance against treaty-based 
Investor-State arbitration. This is the case of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Republic of 
Ecuador and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which have denunciated the ICSID 
Convention, and terminated several investment treaties. Nevertheless it is interesting to analyse 
what these States are proposing as alternative. The more obvious one is domestic courts. This has 
been expressly stated by Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, but interestingly these countries are not 
automatically proposing to go back to a sole domestic jurisdiction for foreign investment 
disputes, as in times when the “Calvo Doctrine” prevailed in Latin America. 
In fact, Ecuador has been leading the proposal to create a regional investment court with an 
appeal facility, and the promotion of ADR mechanisms (like mediation) in the framework of 
UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) – a proposal also endorsed by ALBA (Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America).107 On the other hand, these three countries have not 
rejected international arbitration based on contracts, which is playing an increasing important role 
in the region.108  
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Opposition to Investor-State arbitration and to domestic courts as tools to solve investor–State 
disputes is not exceptional. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) has found that both domestic courts and Investor-State arbitration are unduly costly 
and dilatory mechanisms to settle investment disputes, and have started to promote conflict 
prevention and avoidance measures as alternatives.109  
On the other hand, developed countries’ reliance on domestic courts to resolve a conflict with 
foreign investors not necessarily provide the public policy protection that they are seeking. 
Foreign investors may well present expensive claims against developed countries before domestic 
courts, as they would through investor–State arbitration, and host States do not have reasonable 
assurance of prevailing over foreign investors before a domestic court, or that its national 
investors would succeed before the domestic court of a host partner State. 110 
As Trakman points out with respect to Australia’s rejection of Investor-State Arbitration in the 
negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), developed countries dismissal of investor–
State arbitration may well expose its investors abroad to foreign courts of host States with 
deficient standards of transparency. 111  Kantor has calculated that approximately 76% 
of the cases in which investment treaty awards were rendered up (until June 2006) involved 
countries that ranked at or below 50 on Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption 
                                                          
109 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, at xvi 
(United Nations Publications 2010). 
110 Leon E. Trakman, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, in TRADE 
LIBERALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT 179, 194–95 (Tania Voon ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2013). 
111 Id. at 201. 
  Rodrigo Polanco  
26 
 
Perception Index (CPI), and that 68% of those countries were in the bottom 60% of the 
“rule of law” indicator of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI).112 
Foreign investors might have good reasons not to trust all domestic courts, even from developed 
countries. In the famous award of the Loewen case, relating to the conduct of the Mississippi trial 
court and the Mississippi Supreme Court, and if their acts constituted a violation of NAFTA with 
respect to a foreign investor, the arbitral tribunal found that:113 
“Having read the transcript and having considered the submissions of the parties with respect to 
the conduct of the trial, we have reached the firm conclusion that the conduct of the trial by the 
trial judge was so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of justice amounting to a manifest 
injustice as that expression is understood in international law.” 
Over the past decade there has been a “revival” of the movement of Law & Development, with a 
resurgence of interest in using law to promote development, with an ongoing debate about 
fundamental questions such as whether law is an important factor in determining social or 
economic outcomes in development, or if there are insurmountable economic, political or culture 
obstacles to effective legal reform. However, again on the part of both academics and 
practitioners, the focus of this resumption has been the promotion of development in Asia, 
Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. 114   
Maybe it is time to be open to the possibility that developed countries could also learn about 
development from developing countries. The long experience of Latin America with foreign 
investor-State disputes is a good example of that. 
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